Fireworks factory codes are typically printed in the upper right corner of a side panel of shipping cartons with the product ID #, product description, case pack and origin. This fireworks factory code indicates this factory is in Hunan Province (49) and Factory Number (F467). It is from Lot 065 of approved shipping cartons with the production year 2022.
The General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has established a variety of coding schemes for factories and suppliers of export products and commodities. Lot codes and date codes are also required as well. The purpose of the codes is to track exports and collect the designated export duties.
The factory codes must appear on the export documents as well as the shipping cartons or commodity containers. Exports are inspected by customs officers at the export warehouses that reconcile the export documents to the actual shipments to ensure compliance.
Further inspections of export shipments at inland ports and seaports are conducted in an effort to deter cheating.
Only licensed export fireworks factories have valid factory codes. This is another way for the central government to ensure collection of the export duties, which is one of the most important sources of revenue to the PRC.
Factory codes are by province. Currently there are some 425 valid fireworks factory codes, down from a few thousand just 20 years ago. There are also factories without export factory codes, but they are not licensed to export, only produce fireworks for the domestic market.
This fireworks factory code is printed on an end panel with the gross and net weights, shipping carton size and case packing info. The cartons sizes are used to calculate how many can fit in the shipping containers. prior to loading the containers.. The codes on the bottom indicate the type of shipping carton, in this instance the standard 4G fiberboard shipping carton required for the shipment of this type of hazardous materials (FIREWORKS UN0336 1.4G) and the carton manufacturer, with their respective lot and date codes.
The export fireworks factories are concentrated in three provinces, Hunan, Jiangxi and Guangxi. A factory code that begins with 49 is located in Hunan, which has about 310 export factories, mostly around Liuyang City. There are about 100 export factories in Jiangxi province with factory codes that begin with 40. Guangxi province has about 15 export factories and theirs begin with 72.
Labor shortages and mechanization of many of the processes that used to be done by hand, such as rolling paper tubes, pressing clay plugs into tubes, pasting shell casings, etc. are two primary reasons for many fireworks factories closing. Factories that were unable to make the investment in the new equipment, too far from the electrical grind or that were older or in disrepair were closed.
This fireworks factory code (40F) is for a factory in Jiangxi Province. It now now common for fireworks factories with valid codes to promote their code along with their licenses, certificates and awards from the government in their promotional materials.
The central government of the PRC has made a concerted effort over the last decade or so to close the fireworks factories in the other provinces and concentrate fireworks production in these three provinces. Part of this was due to the many fatal explosions at fireworks factories in more densely populated provinces like Guangdong, and part of it was an effort to provide more employment opportunities in the rural provinces that had been more agricultural.
This move to concentrate fireworks manufacturing in these provinces also was to meet the logistic requirements of moving the fireworks from the factories in the inland provinces to the export ports services by ocean carriers that accept fireworks. This plan was negatively impacted when the fireworks warehouses at Foshan, Guangdong adjacent to a tributary to the Pearl River were destroyed in a massive fireworks fire on February 14, 2008.
I visited the facility 5 years earlier and learned this is where fireworks orders were consolidated from the factories from Jiangxi and Hunan provinces to the north for export via Hong Kong. This however, is another story in and of itself.
The factory codes are generally accurate, but unless one knows the factory code for each factory, it isn’t always helpful in discerning the original source. The Explosive Number (EX#) or Fireworks Certification Number (FC#) also can tell what factory the fireworks are supposed to be manufactured in and even what the devices is supposed to be, but that isn’t always accurate either.
Even if the paperwork with the shipment and the factory code and the EX# or FC# all match what is declared in the shipping carton or the label of the fireworks inside, it isn’t always a guarantee a particular shipment actually came from that particular factory. Or that the fireworks is what it is supposed to be.
This is more of an issue with fireworks that has been mislabeled and misclassified as Consumer Fireworks, FIREWORKS UN0336 1.4G, when in reality is it Display Fireworks and should be classified as FIREWORKS UN0335 1.3G.
This has been an issue for quite sometime and one of the primary reasons for the SE Fireworks tragedy at Enschede, The Netherlands on May, 2000.
The ubiquitous ‘Dragon’ Artillery Shell – Assorted W515B. has been around for decades, and is a vestige from the time all of the fireworks manufacturers in China were state owned enterprises (SOEs). This value priced reloadable shell kit typically contains a mortar consisting of a convolute paper tube with a label attached to a black plastic base, and six (6) round aerial shells. The user places the mortar on a hard, flat surface and loads an aerial shell into the mortar with the green ignition fuse out of the mortar muzzle. Upon ignition, the fuse burns 3-9 seconds and fires the shell into the sky where it bursts with colors and sometimes a report. The process is repeated with the remaining shells one at a time, hence the term “Reloadable Kits. The aerial shells in these reloadable kits are limited by Federal regulations to 60 grams total pyrotechnic composition, with 130mg of explosive composition “intended to create an audible report”, however some contain substantially more of the explosive composition than permitted. This particular W515B was recalled because of Pyrotechnic Materials Overload [16 CFR 1500.17]. Source: CPSC
The US Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) Office of Compliance publishes a spreadsheet with the Notices of Violations (NOVs) it has issued for consumer products that have been found to be non-compliant. The NOVs state the products found to be non-compliant, reference the appropriate Federal law or regulation, and the corrective action the manufacturer or importers is required to take.
The latest update is as of May 2022 and the first NOV in the database is from October 2012.
A review of this database revealed, the CPSC issued 21,956 NOVs of which 698 were for fireworks devices, novelties or clacker balls.
Most of the companies in the database only had one or a few NOVs issued, but a few had many more. Here are the numbers for the Top 6 companies in the NOV database:
Ninety-eight (98) – Company 1
Forty-three (43) – Company 2
Twenty-six (26) – Company 3
Twenty-four (24) – Company 4
Fifteen (15) – Companies 5 & 6
These six (6) companies accounted for 221 of the 698 NOVs issued for fireworks, novelties and clacker balls in this period, or 32% of the total.
This multiple tube aerial fireworks device (cake) was recalled because of Pyrotechnic Materials Overload [16 CFR 1500.17]. Cakes consist of a group of convolute paper tubes, each with a clay plug in the bottom. The tubes are fused sequentially with the first tube also having an ignition fuse. Each tube as a lift charge of blackpowder and an aerial shell.. When the cake is ignited, the aerial shells fire from each tube in a sequence with the shells bursting in the sky with sound and color. Cakes are limited to 500 grams of total pyrotechnic and explosive compositions, including the lift charges, with no more than 130mg of explosive composition “intended to create an audible report” in each shell. Source: CPSC
The company with the most NOVs is, as one might expect, the largest consumer fireworks importer in the country. It makes sense that the more consumer products a company enters into the marketplace, the greater likelihood more of those products will not be in compliance; in particular for mostly handmade products from China like fireworks.
What is surprising is the next largest importers in the USA had none or only a few NOVs during the same time period. The next companies to receive the most NOVs are significantly smaller importers.
Premium priced reloadable kits typically have canister shells that are larger and heavier than ball shells in the value priced reloadable kits. These reloadable kits generally have mortars made of a fiberglass tube with a clay plug on a wooden or plastic base, or high-density polyethene (HDPE) mortars. The canisters shells have a strong paper tube as the casing with a pressed clay plug in the bottom and cement/gypsum plug in the top. This extra weight and confinement produces a more powerful explosion, particularly if the break charge contains more explosive composition than permitted. No matter the shape of the shell, the 60 gram total pyrotechnic composition, with 130mg of explosive composition “intended to create an audible report” remains the standard. This particular canister reloadable kit was recalled because of Fireworks Blowout / Burnout [16 CFR 1507.6]. Source: CPSC
The following are the corrective actions the CPSC required of the manufacturers or importers in the NOVs:
Eighty-six (86) – Consumer Level Recall (RSSC)
One hundred seventy (170) – Correct Future Production (CFP)
One (1) – Distribution Level Recall (DSSC)
Four hundred forty-one (441) – Stop Sale and Correct Future Production (SSC)
The three basic explosive and pyrotechnic compositions in modern Consumer Fireworks aerial shells in reloadable kits and cakes. The lift charge is blackpowder (bottom). It is black from the charcoal and granular i size and shape. The break charge (top left) is a very fine (<100 mesh) gray powder., which is indicative of flash powder. If the break charge was the required blackpowder or an equivalent, it would also be black from the charcoal. The stars (top right) are small balls, cubes or random pellets and typically a dark gray to black, however these are coated with the break charge and thus have the same lighter gray color. Source: Author
These are the CPSC numbers for the NOVs regulations cited:
One (1) General Conformity Certificate Violation [15 USC 2063(a)(1)]
Smoke devices can sometimes explode, often upon ignition. The explosion sends burning composition and debris out in all directions resulting in sever burns to anyone nearby. The cause is a fine metal powder like aluminum that has contaminated the smoke composition,. This problem can be corrected by keeping chemicals used in smoke compositions away from any fine metals. Examining these chemicals prior to production as well as samples from finished smoke devices using X-Ray Fluorescence Spectrometers (XRFs) reduce the chances defective smoke devices reach the consumer. Source: CPSC
The specific types of fireworks devices issued NOVs are a bit difficult to discern because in many instances the only name of the product and a product ID is provided. Skimming the names, it appears the vast majority of NOVs issued are for aerial multiple-tube devices (cakes) and aerial shell reloadable kits.
Note: some fireworks devices may have failed multiple standards, however in this database only a single failed standard is provided.
These firecrackers were recalled because of Pyrotechnic Materials Overload [16 CFR 1500.17].. Firecrackers, no matter how big the external casing, are limited to 50 mg of explosive composition “intended to create an audible report” per cracker. Source: CPSC
DISCUSSION
What is telling is supposedly random samples from each shipment of every fireworks device issued a NOV by the CPSC were tested in China by an independent, third party testing lab. The lab issued a test report stating the samples from that shipment complied with all of the applicable regulations in 16 CFR, as well as any applicable industry standards prior to shipment.
The importer then issued a General Certificate of Conformity (GCC) based on this test report; yet when a few samples from an infinitesimal fraction of the total fireworks devices imported were tested by the CPSC, the samples from the same shipments failed.
No testing program is perfect, and there are often significant variations in the quality and consistency in a shipment of handmade products like fireworks devices; however when the largest third party testing lab routinely reports about 7% of samples from shipments fail their tests, that is indicative of a serious issue with quality control and compliance by the manufacturers.
And when the CPSC issues NOVs for fireworks devices that supposedly passed testing in China, it begs the question: “How reliable is the third party testing program?”
The importers often point to the Chinese manufacturers as being responsible for quality control and compliance, however the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) of 1972 addresses this issue very clearly:
15 U.S.C. § 2052, Sec 3(a) (11) MANUFACTURER.–The term ‘‘manufacturer’’ means any person who manufactures or imports a consumer product.
Thus, for consumer products subject to the CPSA, including fireworks devices, it is the importer’s duty to ensure compliance with the regulations, not the overseas manufacturer.
The CPSC has no formal guidelines for manufacturers and importers to evaluate the potential risks and hazards associated with the thousands of consumer products and hazardous substances subject to the Federal laws and regulations under their jurisdiction. The Federal laws and regulations were enacted with the understanding and expectation that manufacturers and importers have the knowledge of how their products are designed and manufactured, as well as how the general public stores, handles, uses and misuses their products in and around their homes from the normal course of business, and thus are in the best position to assess the potential risks and hazards associated with their products.
Generally, the CPSC recommends manufacturers and importers consider:
(1) How the contents and form of the product might cause an injury, (2) the product’s intended handling, use, and storage, and (3) any accidents that might foreseeably happen during handling, use, or storage that could hurt the purchaser, user or others, including young children who might get into the package of the product.
Given many of the fireworks related injuries occur year after year involving the same or similar fireworks devices, often as a result of misuse but also due to manufacturing defects, with most of the serious injuries and fatalities involving fireworks devices that do not comply with the Federal regulations, in particular Pyrotechnic Materials Overload [16 CFR 1500.17], there is plenty of room for improvement.
Certainly the quality of consumer fireworks has improved over the decades, in particular since the formation of the third party testing program when failure rates were significantly higher (36% in 1994); however at the same time, the general public is also using more consumer fireworks than ever before and many of the fireworks devices have become both larger and more powerful.
Overall the injuries related to fireworks that are reported to the CPSC had been declining since the 1970s, however the estimates have been increasing over the last 16 years (See CPSC Data June 28, 2022). More troubling are increases in serious injuries and fatalities.
Few, if any of the American importers have any formal testing program to check for compliance of the fireworks devices once received from China. At best, most importers might occasionally take a few fireworks devices from some shipments out to the parking lot to shoot or hold demonstrations for prospective buyers.
Random testing of some shipments in the USA received would improve the credibility of the third party testing program in China. So would knowing the test protocols and procedures and substantiation of the handwritten test reports in China with photos and videos of the examinations and tests.
Regular reports that show the pass/fail rates of specific products and each participating factory as well as testers would also be useful to identify potential issues in order to take corrective action.
A more transparent and reliable testing system would substantially improve both credibility and compliance, which in turn would likely reduce fireworks related injuries. Improvements to the industry standards, more detailed warnings and instructions, and a coordinated public education program would reduce fireworks related injuries even more.
What is also revealing is that a few of the largest fireworks importers have very few or even zero NOVs, while smaller importers have many more NOVs. If the volume of NOVs correlated directly to the volume of fireworks devices imported from China, and everything else was equal, one would expect importers to have NOVs corresponding to that volume.
The rate of NOVs does not appear to correspond to the volume of fireworks devices imported by the various companies seems to indicate there are other factors beside volume involved.
One known factor is the CPSC may take samples of fireworks devices from an importer after a report of a serious injury or fatality attributed to a fireworks device importers by that importer. Other factors are complaints and reports to the CPSC from consumers, media reports of incidents involving fireworks devices, follow-up investigations from data gathered by the CPSC National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) and CPSC Office of Import Surveillance (EXIS) levels and experience in comparison to the volume of consumer products being imported.
Another factor why some of the larger importers have fewer NOVS is they have agents working on their behalf at the factories in China. These agents typically facilitate production and logistics, but they also assist the factories with quality assurance and inspection from raw materials to finished products.
Agents may cost the importer a little more and slow production somewhat, however the improved quality results in fewer NOVs, product recalls and presumably fireworks related injuries.
CPSC Recall Notices for Fireworks
Here are some of the CPSC Recall Notices for Fireworks:
The memorial with flowers to the 4 fire fighters that responded to the initial fire on Saturday, May 13, 2000 at the SE Fireworks facility in Enschede, The Netherlands. They fought what they thought was a UN0336 1.4g fireworks fire in the main building. They did not know there were far more powerful fireworks stored at the facility and far more than what it was licensed to store or that a large quantity had been misclassified from 1.3G and 1.1G.
The May 13, 2000 Enschede fireworks disaster (Dutch: vuurwerkramp in Enschede) at the SE Fireworks facility was series of three very powerful blasts, thousands of secondary explosions and subsequent fires that resulted in at least 22 deaths, including 4 firefighters.
The tragic incident injured at least 974 people, many severely, and severely damaged and/or destroyed over 400 homes and businesses.
THE BEGINNING
Enschede is a small city of about 150,000 people inland located near the German and Belgian borders. That Saturday, it was an unusually hot, windy day and unusually dry for the Low Countries along the North Sea.
SE Fireworks was primarily an importer of fireworks that packaged and distributed them in Western Europe. It was located in a mixed industrial and residential neighborhood that was developed in the late 19th and early 20th century.
As is typical for many businesses in metropolitan areas in Western Europe, the compound was surrounded by a tall brick wall with a large gate to the street. Houses and small businesses were adjacent to and across from the facility.
In the early afternoon a small fire broke out at the compound. The local fire brigade responded and attacked the fire in the main building with water hoses. A crowd gathered in the street outside the compound to witness the event.
At first the fire seemed to be confined to packing materials, but then it spread to the fireworks stored in nearby bunkers. The fireworks started shooting off in many directions, resulting in even more fireworks exploding and shooting into the air.
Photos and video taken by bystanders showed one of the owners running from the facility as the intensity of the fireworks going off increased.
A powerful fireworks blast occurred shortly after he moved out of view. The fireworks continued to go off with changing intensity as the fire moved through the facility. A second and third large blast followed with more fireworks going off all around the area.
The explosions killed the 4 fire fighters who were on the scene attempting to control the initial fire. Debris, firebrand and burning fireworks from the explosions came down in the area.
One of the blasts in the reinforced concrete bunker left a 4 foot (1.3 m) deep crater that was over 40 feet (13 m) wide. The most powerful blast was felt some 19 miles (30 km) away.
The blast damage was over 400 meters from the facility, with secondary fire damage up to 1 km away. Some of the largest pieces of debris, including pieces of reinforced concrete from the bunker, landed over ½ km.
THE FIREWORKS FACILITY
The SE Fireworks facility consisted of an administrative building, a main building (reinforced concrete ) w/ 13 “bunkers” where fireworks were stored, plus a “packing room”. The main building had initially been erected for a cardboard recycling facility that serviced the nearby Grolsch Brewery.
There were also 7 MAVO Boxes (A type of portable garage) and 14 – 40′ ISO shipping containers used for fireworks storage in small groups inside the compound. The groups of Mavo boxes and ISO containers were only separated from each other by a narrow walkway.
FIREWORKS CLASSIFICATIONS
The facility was licensed for 158,000 kilos of fireworks classified as UN0336, 1.4g. The fireworks were primarily imported from China for distribution in Western Europe.
In reality, the facility had far more fireworks in storage than what it was licensed to contain. And more importantly, it contained tons of more powerful fireworks that should have been classified as either UN0335 1.3g or UN033 1.1g, including 12″ (305mm) aerial fireworks shells and salutes (flash powder based explosives).
These larger, more powerful fireworks are typically for professional use only in many countries. They present a mass explosion hazard, in particular when there are significant quantities in one place at one time.
Fireworks that are classified as UN0335 1.3g or UN033 1.1g usually have more stringent shipping, storage and handling standards than those for fireworks classified as UN0336, 1.4g. This is because of the greater hazard they present over their smaller, less powerful cousins.
Subsequent investigation revealed the fireworks were imported as UN 0336 1.4g because they were shipped from China under INCO terms Cost, Insurance, and Freight (CIF), which means the shipper must pay for the shipment rather than the buyer. As a result, the shippers will often choose the lowest dangerous goods classification for the particular commodity because it saves them money.
The transportation system is based in large part on trust that shippers will properly classify and declare their shipments. The ocean carriers, port and customs officials, and trucking companies will accept this classification, usually without question.
Holland, like many other countries, bases their the import, port, inland shipping and storage requirements on the the shipping classifications declared by the original shipper.
Many importers knowingly will take advantage of the situation, and even encourage shippers to use the wrong classifications because it saves money. It also may allow them to sell larger, more powerful fireworks devices to the general public.
BUILDINGS & STRUCTURES
Dutch homes and buildings are primarily wood frame structures with brick facades and clay tile roofs. This was a style mandated from the 14th century to reduce the risks of large fires in the densely populated cities and villages.
Unfortunately, the powerful blasts blew the windows out in many structures and also stripped the clay tiles off many roofs. This exposed the combustible contents to the smaller, secondary explosions of the fireworks spread over the area from the blasts. The high winds and hot temperatures also exacerbated the situation with firebrand from the initial fires.
Fire fighters were initially overwhelmed by the scope and intensity of the fires. Fire brigades from around the region, including neighboring Germany responded, but it took hours to get the fires under control.
CAUSE
A man came forward and confessed to starting the initial fire, however his story did not add up and he was eventually cleared.
It was known that the owners sometimes demonstrated small fireworks for customers inside the compound. There were reports that this was the case that day as well, however substantiated this proved difficult.
The the normal operating procedure was to open the doors of the packing room, the bunkers, the MAVO Boxes and the 40′ ISO containers to be able to access the fireworks for the workers to put orders together for shipment to customers. This certainly was a factor in the fire spreading to the fireworks stored in the bunker with the first large blast.
THE RESPONSE
The fire fighters knew there were fireworks stored at SE Fireworks. In fact, they had purchased smoke devices for training. However, they were expecting to fight a fire of fireworks that were classified as UN0336 1.4g, which are never supposed to be a mass explosion hazard.
The neighborhood street was not evacuated because the fire fighters reacted based on the information that had from the Dutch government that licensed the facility. And the Dutch government in turn relied on the documents provided by SE Fireworks from the Chinese exporters that classified the fireworks as UN0336 1.4g.
Thus the response was not what it should have been, which would be to evacuate the area and not attempt to fight fires near large quantities of explosives with a mass explosion hazard.
CARDINAL RULES
No matter the initial cause, or the quantity of fireworks permitted by licensed or over the license, many of the cardinal rules of explosives storage and operations, especially for fireworks which are sensitive to impact, friction, heat, spark and flame were violated:
limit the quantity of fireworks in any one place at one time
the larger and more powerful the fireworks, the father away they need to be stored from public roads and occupancies as well as from each other
keep all fireworks storage magazines protected (doors closed) unless actively coming or going
eliminate or control all potential sources of ignition
restrict, limit or control all combustible materials (grass, weeds, shipping cartons, pacing materials, etc.) in or around fireworks storage magazines
if fireworks are tested, only do so in designated areas that are safe distances from stored fireworks
have an emergency response plan in place for the types and quantities of fireworks being handled and stored at the facility
educate and train employees and first responders to the emergency plan
understand that fireworks have solid fuels and oxidizers – they do not rely on atmospheric oxygen for combustion – only large quantities of water, can have an impact on burning fireworks
only fight small fires of combustible materials that are outside of fireworks storage magazines that can be suppressed quickly
only contain fires of fireworks that are UN 0336 1.4g from safe distance
never fight a fire of fireworks that are UN 0335 1.3g or UN033 1.1g – retreat, evacuate and prepare mass explosions followed by secondary explosions and fires
In most other countries a fireworks facility with this quantity of these types of fireworks would never, ever be permitted to be in a densely populated part of a city. Instead, it would be required to be in a remote area covering dozens of acres of open, unoccupied land.
A child looks through a plexiglass window in the plywood wall erected around the burned out neighborhood in Enschede, The Netherlands.
MY ROLE
I have served on the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Technical Committee on Pyrotechnics since 1988. One of the Fire Codes we are responsible for is NFPA 1124, Code for the Manufacture, Transportation, and Storage of Fireworks and Pyrotechnic Articles.
I had met the previous owner of SE Fireworks and had some basic idea about the operation and Dutch regulations. It seemed incredible that a modern country like Holland could experience a tragedy of this scale.
I began to make inquiries to try to learn more and managed to make contact with officials in Holland, including fire fighters and witnesses in Enschede. I began to learn not everything was as it seemed.
In March of the following year, I visited Enschede at my own expense. I met with fire fighters, officials and witnesses, and learned more about what happened and especially why.
My paper Enschede: Lessons to Relearn was presented at the 6th International Symposium on Fireworks in Orlando, Florida in December 2001.
Fireworks displays from atop Mount Rushmore National Memorial began in 1998 and ended in 2009. The 2001 show cancelled due to a severe drought. The National Park Service (NPS) halted the shows due to the higher fuel loads in the Ponderosa pine forest as a result of a pine beetle infestation that killed many trees, as well as non-compliance with Federal and State regulations, and national fire codes. Note the burning vegetation below Roosevelt and Lincoln.
The Mount Rushmore (MORU) National Memorial in the Black Hills of South Dakota is one of the most iconic national memorials administered by the National Park Service (NPS). It is the state’s most popular attraction with about 3,000,000 annual visitors from around the world.
The carvings of MORU (Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt) were blasted out of the smooth, fine grain granite by some 400 workers between 1927 and 1941. Each carving is about 60 feet tall on southeast side of the mountain, which is 5,725 feet above sea level and some 500 feet above the Amphitheater.
Most visitors drive from Rapid City about 35 minutes away. The typical visit is a little more than an hour. As a result, there is a lot of turnover even during peak times.
This news report from South Dakota Public Broadcasting (SDPB) provides additional background on the history and the issues of the fireworks display from the Monument.
Thunderstorms with winds and lightning are serious safety concerns in the summer months. NPS staff monitor the weather closely and as it happened on July 3, 2020, a thunderstorm rolled in to the Black Hills with gusting winds shortly after the fireworks display concluded.
From 1998 to 2001 and 2003 to 2009 a non-profit organization (NPO) that partners with the NPS at MORU sponsored a fireworks display on July 3rd.
The fireworks displays were fired by a professional fireworks display company and consisted of thousands of aerial fireworks up to 12” and fired electrically from high density polyethylene (HDPE) mortars in above ground wood frame racks, as well as multiple tube devices (cakes).
The aerial shells were electrically fired from the canyon behind the carvings and the cakes from an top pf the carvings. The electrical firing system was located inside the Hall of Records at the base of the canyon.
In February 2009, NPS staff completed an internal report that addressed concerns with the feasibility of the location of this discharge site, to the manner in which fireworks display was set up and conducted, to the challenges with a fireworks display in a large forest on steep slopes, to the safety and security of the spectators, to the compliance with national fire codes, as well as Federal and state laws.
The 2010 fireworks display was cancelled based on the concerns raised in the 2009 NPS report and recent forest conditions that increased the fuel load and risk from a forest fire.
In December 2018, Governor Kristi Noem was attending a state governors conference and met wit President Donald Trump. She asked him to bring back the fireworks to Mount Rushmore. He directed the NPS to do so and the NPS began the process of determining the feasibility of bringing back the fireworks display.
On May 6, 2019, the Department of the Interior and the State of South Dakota signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) “to work to return fireworks to Mount Rushmore National Memorial in a safe and responsible manner on July 3, July 4, or July 5, beginning in the year 2020”.
In July 2019, staff from MORU and Regional NPS offices as well as from the South Dakota State Fire Marshal (SD SFM) and the Rapid City Fire Department (RC FD) surveyed potential discharge sites at MORU for a fireworks display in early July 2020. The group determined there were six potential discharge sites.
On September 6, 2019 the NPS retained the Author to conduct a survey and evaluation of the potential discharge sites to comply with national fire codes and best practices, as well as Federal and state laws.
The NPS provided the Author with the information available to date.
In October of 2019, the Author surveyed Mount Rushmore and met with NPS and South Dakota State Fire Marshal (SFM) staff.
There are no roads or trails to the top of Mount Rushmore and the area is closed to the public. It is quite a hike to be able to stand on top of Washington’s head (Lincoln behind my left shoulder). Every possible location for every type of fireworks was scouted and evaluated.
FIREWORKS DISPLAY OF JULY 3, 2020
The contract was awarded after the State of South Dakota and the NPS evaluated proposals from a number of fireworks display companies.
Here is a video of the show performed by Pyro Spectaculars of Rialto, California. It was an outstanding production anywhere, but even more so given the challenges of this unique site.
Mount Rushmore is the top visitor destination in the State of South Dakota.
NPS DECLINED SPECIAL EVENT PERMIT FOR 2021
The NPS routinely evaluates special events and this one was no different. As stewards of our national parks, monuments and memorials, the NPS is charged with preserving and protecting these treasures as well as providing for public and employee safety.
After evaluating the issues with the July 3, 2020 fireworks display, the NPS declined to issue a special use permit to conduct a fireworks event at Mount Rushmore on July 3, 2021.
The reasons cited were:
public and employee health issues with a large public gathering during the COVID-19 pandemic
objections from sovereign tribes with treaty rights to the land
the logistics with turning away tens of thousands of visitors (only guests with special event tickets are allowed to enter for the event that starts at 3:00 PM of presentations, speeches and music culminating with the fireworks display) [there is only one road to the memorial and normally visitors come and go throughout the day]
the environmental concerns over perchlorate contamination and potential for wildfires
an ongoing construction project at the memorial
The State of South Dakota sued the NPS [Noem v. Haaland, No. 21-2542 (8th Cir. Jul. 27, 2022)] claiming the decision was “arbitrary and capricious”, but the court ruling was the NPS acted according to the law, so the special event permit denial was sustained.
The viewshed of the carvings is also limited within the Visitors Center. It is has been built to handle the visitors than spend about an hour or so at the Monument.
WHAT’S NEXT?
What’s next for fireworks displays from Mount Rushmore in 2022 and beyond?
The construction project is completed. The COVID-19 pandemic will eventually subside. But the other three reasons the NPS declined the special event permit for 2020 have not changed; in fact these reasons were in play for all prior years and will be in play for all future years.
The NPS will continue to consider and evaluate these reasons with the various sovereign tribes, the State of South Dakota and others, but whether there will be another July 3rd fireworks display at Mount Rushmore remains to be seen.
One of the few locations along South Dakota Highway 244 where the carvings of Mount Rushmore are fully visible. There are limited places for parking and no amenities. During peak visiting periods, traffic can be almost bumper to bumper on this stretch of highway going into the Memorial.
2022 Update
The State of South Dakota appealed the 2021 Federal court decision to the 8th Circuit United States Court of Appeals. In early 2022, it also applied to the NPS for the special event permit for a fireworks display on July 3, 2022, which was rejected for the same basic reasons as in 2021.
Sixteen other Republican-led states submitted amicus briefs in support of the State of South Dakota’s appeal, while the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe supported the NPS.
The Court ruled [Noem v. Haaland, No. 21-2542 (8th Cir. Jul. 27, 2022)] that the State of South Dakota lacked standing to challenge the NPS permitting process because “(n)obody has the right to shoot off fireworks on someone else’s land(n)obody has the right to shoot off fireworks on someone else’s land” without permission.
Given Mount Rushmore is NPS land, only the NPS can approve a fireworks display at Mount Rushmore, and can only do so within the constraints of numerous Federal laws and regulations, it is up to the NPS to determine whether a fireworks display is advisable in the future.
A lone burned tree trunk serves as a remined that forest fire risks here are always a concern, especially in the heat of the summer. Controlled burns are used carefully to reduce the fuel load, however there are only certain times of the year these are feasible.
Thus, until and unless the NPS determines that the conditions are appropriate for another fireworks display, it is doubtful there will be another in the future. This is not to say that theatrical pyrotechnics or other types of special effects could not be used as part of a short program in the future.
One factor that is not cited in this dispute is that although the State of South Dakota pays for the fireworks display, and many of the services (traffic control, EMS, fire protection, etc.) outside of Mount Rushmore, the NPS must pay for all of the services for planning, organizing, performing and staffing (security, food service, maintenance, etc. ) the program in the amphitheater followed by the fireworks display from the top of Mount Rushmore. This is a substantial sum that comes out of the NPS budget because as a high profile event, the required security measures are understandably quite substantial.
The security measures with a Presidential visit are even higher for both the State of South Dakota and the various agencies of the Federal government, further increasing the costs.
This photo of the Mount Rushmore Visitor Center from atop the mountain clearly shows how limited the viewshed is from below. The Amphitheater is in the foreground with the Grand View Terrace and Avenue of Flags. The Gift Shop and Carver’s Cafe is to the rear with the Information Center, rest rooms and parking ramp. South Dakota Highway 244 and the entrance are to the rear.
WHY DOES SOUTH DAKOTA WANT THE FIREWORKS DISPLAY?
Given the reality that there are only 7,500 tickets available to the public into Mount Rushmore for the July 3rd program and fireworks display, and there are only a few locations the fireworks display is even visible outside of the Memorial, why does the State of South Dakota want it so badly?
The fireworks display alone is $350,000 USD because of the greater expense of moving the crew, gear and fireworks manually up and down the mountain. Add in all the other expenses for security, traffic control, EMS and fire protection, and the cost to the state is substantially higher.
Small numbers of spectators can watch the fireworks display from outside Mount Rushmore, but because of the hills and trees, there are only a few locations it is visible, and these are some distance away. Any places along the side of the highway have limited space for people and parked cars, and none will have any amenities such as food, beverages and bathrooms.
The view of Keystone, South Dakota from near the top of Mount Rushmore. It is the one of the few places one can see the Memorial in the far distance [1.9 miles (3.0km)] and the only place with any amenities.
The nearest town with amenities is Keystone, SD is 1.9 miles (3.0km), but it also has only a few places one can see the Memorial in the far distance.
Access on the only highway to Mount Rushmore is severely limited, so people who believe they can drive out to visit the Memorial or see the fireworks display will be turned away.
The answer to the question why the State of South Dakota wants it so badly is simple: South Dakota sees this is a huge public relations boost because on the 4th of July the TV news and other media outlets highlight the fireworks display from Mount Rushmore. They have determined that the value of the “free” publicity in the media is greater than the cost of the fireworks display and all the other expenses.
Granted, now the fireworks display can be livestreamed and many people, including the author tuned in; however watching a fireworks display on a small, two dimensional screen has limited appeal for most people.
What is interesting however is to compare the economic impact of tourism on the State of South Dakota in the years with the fireworks display to the years without the fireworks display.
The second and most powerful explosion in Hold 6 in front of the accommodation aboard the M/V Hanjin Pennsylvania, November 15, 2002 off the coast of Sri Lanka. This is one of a number of photos of this explosion taken by the Ship’s Master from aboard a salvage vessel. When the photos of this explosion went around the world various news sources described it as a “fireworks explosion”, however to anyone that knows fireworks, it is not a fireworks explosion. Eight (8) of the sixteen (16) slot charters that carried fireworks aboard ocean container vessels subsequently banned any and all shipments of fireworks aboard their vessels, resulting in significant increase in shipping rates and constriction of available slots aboard container vessels, especially for FIREWORKS UN0335 1.3G Here are the problems with the conclusion this is a “fireworks explosion” based on these photos: First, 40 foot containers of fireworks always have thousands of different fireworks devices, which typically result in multiple smaller explosions, building to a single large explosion, followed by many more smaller explosions. Second, a container of fireworks rarely if ever has a single type or style of fireworks, so there would be multiple colors (red and green being the most common) and multiple effects. rather than a single color (silver) and a single effect. Third, typical fireworks stars burn only for a few seconds and even custom stars for the largest fireworks shells in the world burn for only about 10 seconds. Silver in fireworks are typically created using flakes of aluminum, magnesium or titanium that only burn for portions of a second and would never burn long enough to rise up this high and then trail all the way back to the sea. Only large pieces of one of these metals can burn long enough to reach the height of this explosion and then trail burning effects all the way back to the sea. Fireworks are not stowed below decks or by the accommodation. They are stowed above decks near the bow (Holds 1-3). There were no containers of fireworks stowed below decks or anywhere other than Holds 1-3. Finally, there were two (2) containers of magnesium ingots stowed in Hold 6, which would account for the single, silver color and the long duration time of the silver effects all the way to the top down to the sea. The radiant heat from the fires above Hold 6 and the adjacent Hold 5, combined with the confinement of the six (6) 30 ton hatches pinned in place and the stacked containers above, would be more than sufficient to result in a fuel-air explosion of the general cargo consisting of carbon based materials (Note the orange flame and black smoke indicative of carbon fuels) and the magnesium ingots.
The M/V Hanjin Pennsylvania was a 930 foot (282 m), 50,242 metric ton container vessel with a capacity of 4,389 Twenty-foot equivalency units (TEUs) on its 5th voyage from Asia to Europe. It was loaded with as many as 8 levels of containers stowed above decks and 14 levels of containers below decks.
Holds 1-6 are in front of the accommodation (The bridge and crew quarters) and general cargo is stowed below decks. Refrigerated cargo is stowed above decks where the crew can monitor and maintain the refrigeration units, which have both electric and diesel power units.
Hazardous materials, like chemicals, batteries, fireworks, etc. are stowed above decks near the bow (Holds 1-3) so they are away from the accommodation and the machinery. This also keeps them out of the holds below decks where they are confined by the hatches and containers above decks.
Holds 7 and 8 are behind the accommodation and above the machinery for general cargo.
There were over 50 containers of declared fireworks classified for transportation purposes as FIREWORKS UN0336 1.4G on board and stowed above decks in Holds 1-3. These types of fireworks devices are typically the smaller fireworks packaged for retail sales to consumers.
These shipments were bound for sale in Europe for the New Year’s Eve holiday, although some shipments are misdeclared and should be classified as FIREWORKS UN0336 1.3G or FIREWORKS UN0333 1.1G, which would be stowed in the same manner.
THE INITIAL FIRE
About 6:00 AM local time on November 11, 2002 and 88 miles (141 km) off the coast of Sri Lanka, there was a fire in a container stowed above deck on the port side of Hold 4. Two sailors apparently attempted to fight the fire when there was an explosion. One sailor was killed and the other went missing, presumably blown overboard by the blast.
The fire then swept to other containers, including some stowed above deck in Hold 3 that contained fireworks, which began to go off as the fires reach the contents. The crew fought the fires as best they could under the circumstances and salvage tugs were dispatched to assist.
FIRES ABOARD CONTAINER SHIPS
One of the challenges with fires aboard a container vessel is the difficulty to suppress fires inside the steel containers. There is limited space between the rows of stacked containers, which are all enclosed.
As the fires spread from container to container and build in intensity, the radiant heat will ignite the contents of other containers. This often spreads the fire further and faster than fire fighting efforts can manage.
Compounding the challenge with fire fighting on container vessels is the radiant heat will also spread the fires to containers stowed below decks. And then fires will spread via radiant heat from hold to hold.
FIRES BURNED FOR 4 DAYS
Over the next 4 days the fires raged both above and below decks as tons of water were poured onto the vessel from the tugs. The ship was abandoned except for a small crew that maintained the machinery and the pumps.
Fireworks in some containers stowed above decks exploded and shot out of the containers during these fire fighting efforts. Over the days of water being poured onto the burning containers, the ship took on so much water that it settled very low in the water.
THE “FIREWORKS” EXPLOSION
Then on November 15, 2002 there was a massive explosion in Hold 6 in front of the accommodation. This explosion was so powerful it tore 30 ton hatches off their pins and tossed some of them and stacks of loaded containers into the sea.
The photos of this explosion were described as a “fireworks explosion, however it only looked like a fireworks explosion to the untrained eye.
MY INVESTIGATION
During my investigation, I managed to obtain the manifest for this sailing that showed there were two (2) containers of magnesium ingots stowed below decks in Hold 6. The manifest also showed no containers of fireworks stowed above deck in Hold 4.
The photos and descriptions of the initial fire and explosion of the single container above Deck in Hold 4 was more like a fire and explosion of calcium hypochlorite rather than any types of fireworks devices. This is a chemical that is used to purifying water and in swimming pools and is sensitive to both heat and moisture
Calcium hypochlorite can start fires and explode, especially when confined by itself, packaging, in a steel container or any combination. Thus it requires special handling and stowage, especially when carried by a vessel sailing on the ocean subject to sea spray and rain squalls along the equator.
This special handling and stowage adds to the cost of shipping. For companies that ship calcium hypochlorite under INCO terms Cost, Insurance, and Freight (CIF), it means they must pay more to ship their chemicals to customers. As a result, there is an incentive for shippers to not declare their shipments as hazardous materials, or choose a hazardous materials classification that costs less to ship, but is not handled and stowed as required.
There are a number of examples of containers of calcium hypochlorite that experienced fire and explosions aboard other container vessels before and after the initial fire and explosion aboard the M/V Hanjin Pennsylvania. In some instances the calcium hypochlorite was declared and in others it was considered “rogue”. Subsequent investigations revealed the stability of the calcium hypochlorite varies and the way it is packaged is also an issue.
Other suspected or known fires and explosions of calcium hypochlorite aboard container vessels include: M/V Aconcagua (1998), M/V Charlotte Maersk (2010), M/V CMA Djakarta (1999), M/V Contship France (1997), M/V DG Harmony (1998), M/V KMTC Hongkong (2019), M/V Maersk Mombasa (1998), M/V Mass (1997), M/V Recife (1991), M/V Sea Express (1998), M/V Tiger Wave (1997), and the M/V Zim Haifa (2007).
Maersk one of the largest ocean shipping carriers in the world, banned the transport of calcium hypochlorite in August 2015. Bans alone do little to prevent hazardous materials from being misdeclared because the system relies on the integrity of the shipper to properly classify and declare their cargos.
THE AFTERMATH
The M/V Hanjin Pennsylvania was declared a total loss and general average was declared. General average is a method of spreading the loss out to all of the parties, even if their cargo was untouched.
The vessel was towed back to Singapore for the final survey and damage assessment. Sound containers were unloaded and surveyed for internal damage, including most of the containers of fireworks. These are auctioned off to the highest bidders, with with the proceeds used to offset the loss.
The financial loss was $235 million, which was the highest maritime loss up to that point in time. The hull was eventually refurbished and sailed for various ocean carriers until 2016 when it was scrapped.
Shortly after the incident, I was commissioned by the National Fireworks Association (NFA) as an independent expert to investigate the cause and submit a report with my findings. I was dispatched to Singapore where the vessel had been towed for salvage. I surveyed the vessel from a small boat and some of the containers in Singapore, including the surviving containers of fireworks.
I also met with various officials and others to gather information. The process of a ship being salvaged and the payment of damage claims is very interesting to say the least!
Later, I spent a month visiting shipping and fireworks facilities and met with officials in Seoul, Shanghai, Beijing, Liuyang, Changsha, Guangdong, Hong Kong and Los Angeles in order to trace fireworks shipments from the factories through the supply chain to ports in the USA.
My report “M/V Hanjin Pennsylvania : Explosions at Sea” was submitted to the NFA in September 2003 and published in the Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Fireworks, October 6 -10, 2003 Valencia, Spain.
This is the MV Hanjin Pennsylvania showing the port side of Hold 6 in front of the accommodation while salvage operations continue at a remote berth in Singapore. Note the worker in the blue coveralls standing on top of a 30 ton hatch that was blown off its pins from the force of the send explosion. Many of the loaded 40 foot containers stowed on top of this hatch, as well as the deck hatch and loaded 40 foot containers behind were blown into the sea.
The report has been referenced by a number of organizations and agencies including Lloyds of London and the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) submitted by Denmark to the International Maritime Organization (MTO) Maritime Safety Committee in September of 2009.
